Introduction
The aim and layout of the paper This paper looks at the current state of international law governing the arms 1 trade and its implications for a future Arms Trade Treaty. It covers a wide range of sometimes overlapping bodies of international law, specifically the UN Charter, human rights and humanitarian law, and international criminal law.
As this paper describes, States Parties to relevant treaties are bound by express obligations not to transfer certain weapons while all UN Member States are prohibited from transferring any weapons to certain recipients in accordance with mandatory Security Council arms embargoes. There is also a set of norms found across various instruments that guide decisions by States on situations where the transfer of arms may breach an international obligation. In general, however, it will be seen that the rules of international law regulating the arms trade are fragmented and dispersed, which underpins the need for a comprehensive treaty governing the arms trade.
An overview of the arms trade

For several reasons, there is no straightforward answer to the question, 'How big is the international arms trade?' First, there is no globally agreed definition of 'arms'. … Second, there is no common agreement on what types of activities constitute the arms trade. … Third, the lack of openness and transparency by many arms suppliers and recipients regarding the value and volume of their arms exports and imports makes it difficult to collect accurate data. ... This has implications for efforts to establish controls on arms transfers via a future international arms trade treaty ….
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As the above quotation suggests, there is no robust figure for the annual value of the international arms trade. Even one of the world's leading authorities on the arms trade, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), has 1 The terms arms and weapons are used interchangeably in this paper. See below Section 1.3 for a discussion of their definition. . In fact, the percentage would be even higher since with no internationally recognised definition of 'combat aircraft', Wezeman defines them, for the purposes of the fact sheet cited, as 'jet-engined aircraft primarily designed to engage in air-to-air or air-to-ground combat. He notes that this definition does not include the substantial number of smaller jet-engined trainer aircraft that often have a secondary or even primary combat role (such as the Chinese K-8 or the British Hawk), other light armed aircraft (such as the Brazilian EMB-314, the Swiss PC-7 and PC-9 or the US AC-208), anti-submarine warfare aircraft, or armed helicopters.
Result of a US Department of Defense Working Group cited in ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of
'Conventional' arms/weapons
Despite the lack of a formal definition of 'arms' or a 'weapon', there is widespread agreement that 'conventional' arms are all arms/weapons except those that are nuclear, biological, and chemical in nature. 15 The term 'conventional weapons' is widely used, including in the title of a convention regulating the use and transfer of certain conventional weapons, adopted under the auspices of the UN in 1980.
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Diversion and end-user certificates
The risk of diversion to unauthorised end users (whether States, non-State actors, or others) is a well known phenomenon of the arms trade. End-user certificates may be a sham or may be simply ignored by the recipient and transferred on to an unauthorised user. For instance, in the case of small arms and light weapons (SALW), according to a publication by the NGO, Saferworld:
The vast majority of illicit or uncontrolled SALW in the world have been diverted from authorised legal transfers or holdings. There are relatively few SALW that have been illicit throughout their existence -from production to illicit end-use(r) -although such arms are a significant problem in some contexts.
In virtually every part of the world, the two most important factors contributing to diversion of SALW to unauthorised or illicit uses or users are: diversion of authorised SALW transfers, due to inadequate arms transfer controls; • and diversion from official or authorised holdings of SALW, due to inadequate • management or security of such holdings.
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Munition/ammunition
There is no international definition of 'munition' or 'ammunition', even though the terms are widely used in international treaties and standards. According to the US Department of Defense, a munition is: 5 In common usage, 'munitions' [plural] can be military weapons, ammunition, and equipment.) 18 The issue of whether the terms ammunition and munition are synonyms was discussed within the context of the ATT, notably during the Boston Symposium on the Arms Trade Treaty held in September 2010 19 and then the Second PrepCom in February/March 2011. It was not clear to participants whether ammunition was a sub-set of munition. However, the deletion of the reference in the Chair's Draft Paper of 3 March 2011 20 to 'munitions' was deemed by certain States to have removed bombs and mines, among other things, from the scope of the draft.
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The draft International Small Arms Control Standards define ammunition (for the purpose of small arms and light weapons control) as: the complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles, that are used in small arms or light weapons.
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The definition, which is based on the one contained in Article 3(c) of the UN Firearms Protocol, 23 further notes that the term includes cartridges (rounds) for small arms; shells, grenades and missiles for light weapons; and mobile containers with missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems. 24 The ordinary definition of ammunition is 'a supply or quantity of bullets or shells'.
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Trade
In ordinary parlance, trade is the 'action of buying and selling goods and services.' 26 It is clear, however, that this definition is too narrow for the purposes of the ATT, as it would too easily allow the obligations set down in the future treaty to be avoided (e.g. through brokering, trans-shipment, gift, leasing, etc.) The UN General Assembly resolution calling for the negotiation of an ATT referred to the need to regulate 'import, export and transfer' in a preambular paragraph, although the operative paragraph calling for negotiations only referred to the decision to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms. 
Transfer
Transfer is a broad term which ostensibly covers any form of import or export or gift. Its use in certain humanitarian/disarmament treaties, 28 though, has given rise to ambiguity and dispute as to whether the definition covers transfer of title to weapons without physical movement or transit of weapons without corresponding transfer of title. Thus, for example, Article 2, paragraph 15, of 1996 Amended Protocol II on mines provides that:
"Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced mines. explicit, however, that this and other definitions set out within Resolution 1540 were 'for the purpose of this resolution only'.
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THE UN CHARTER
The founding instrument of the United Nations, the 1945 UN Charter, is a universal instrument, which represents the cornerstone of the international legal order and sets out the fundamental principles of international law related to international peace and security. The UN Charter provides a basic legal framework for arms trade through many of its provisions. In keeping with its overall purposes and principles, the UN and its organs have a legitimate interest in the field of arms transfer, as is recognised by the UN Charter. Thus, Article 11, paragraph 1; Article 26; and Article 47 of the Charter refer specifically to the importance of the regulation of 'armaments' for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Furthermore, '[g]uided by the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter', the UN General Assembly has declared that the unregulated arms trade contributes to international and non-international armed conflict, international crimes, and terrorism, and undermines peace and security. 31 At the same time, however, the Assembly has acknowledged 'the right of all States to manufacture, import, export, transfer and retain conventional arms for self-defence and security needs, and in order to participate in peace support operations.' 32 Several UN Charter provisions demand consideration in light of the arms trade, particularly those governing the right to self-determination and equal rights of peoples, human rights, the prohibition on the threat or use of force, the obligation of the UN not to intervene 'in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state', and the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. The interpretation and implementation of these provisions, both individually and in the context of the broader legal framework, serves as a starting point for their application to the arms trade. Some of the provisions may be in apparent conflict with each other and one of the challenges for the negotiators of the future Arms Trade Treaty will be to balance the legitimate interests of States in the arms trade against other interests and values, such as development and the enjoyment of human rights.
UN Security Council arms embargoes
The UN Security Council has on numerous occasions prohibited the transfer of arms to specific States or non-State entities by means of embargoes. 
Non-intervention
International law prohibits States from interfering directly or indirectly in the internal or external affairs of any other State where such interference threatens that State's sovereignty or political independence.
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The prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other State is a fundamental principle of customary international law. 48 The crucial Article in the UN Charter which covers intervention by States is Article 2(4), which states that: This prohibition is generally understood as the threat or use of 'armed force' in international relations, but it has to be read broadly. 49 The 
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Intervention is prohibited when it uses methods of coercion, either in the direct form of military action or in the indirect form of support for non-State actors fighting against the State. Thus, the ICJ, in the Nicaragua Case, imputed to the US all the actions of US organs aimed at training, arming, equipping and financing the insurgent military group against Nicaragua was in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene or interfere in the affairs of another State. 52 The US was held to have incurred responsibility for its own action and conduct, however, the ICJ did not consider as attributable to US some actions by contras in breach of international humanitarian law (killing of prisoners, indiscriminate killing of civilians, torture, rape and kidnapping).
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The ICJ stated that the principle of non-intervention derives from customary international law and while intervention is already allowable at the request of the government of a State, it is not allowed at the request of its opposition group in the present state of international law. 54 Thus it stated that '[i]t would certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention were to be justified by a mere request for assistance made resort to armed force at the domestic level (insurgency, civil war), although any resort to force should be in conformity with the rules of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.
by an opposition group in another State.' 55 This being said, nothing precludes the UN Security Council from issuing a resolution that would seek to assist an opposition group within a State. In this sense, it could be argued that the UN Security Council resolution would take priority over the principle of non-intervention by virtue of Article 103 of the UN.
56 Concurrently, it could be argued that derogations from well-established principles of customary international law should be made explicit in the text of a resolution.
Individual and collective self-defence
The 'inherent' right to self-defence is often claimed as a principle or even the legal basis by which States may lawfully acquire any weapons. Among the exceptions to the prohibition on the threat or use of force, Article 51 of the UN Charter recognises the right to individual or collective self-defence:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security...
The exercise of self-defence is thus subject to the State concerned having been the victim of an 'armed attack', which presupposes a violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter. Indeed, the ICJ made it clear in several occasions that the existence of an armed attack is a conditio sine qua non required for the lawful exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence.
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As noted above, assistance to a non-State armed group may constitute unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of the State or States in which that group is operating and may even be regarded as a threat or use of force. 58 However, both the ICJ and State practice have held that material support to non-State armed groups in the form of weapons or logistical support is not considered an 'armed attack'. 'But the Court does not believe that the concept of armed attack includes not only acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Such assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of other States.' Nicaragua Case, op. cit., §195.
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See also Judge Ruda's separate opinion in the Nicaragua Case:
From my point of view it would have been sufficient to say, just as the Court does in its conclusions, that even if there was such assistance and flow of arms, that is not a sufficient excuse for invoking self-defence, because, juridically, the concept of 'armed attack' does not include assistance to rebels.
ibid., §13. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jennings stated that although the mere provision of arms cannot be said to amount to an armed attack, 'the provision of arms may, nevertheless, be a very important element in what might be thought to amount to armed attack, where it is coupled with other kinds of involvement.' ibid., p. 543.
12
The right of self-defence can only be exercised in response to an armed attack, including a serious and imminent threat of such an attack, and thus it cannot be exercised against acts that do not reach the threshold of an armed attack. Therefore this inherent right cannot be claimed in abstracto to justify the importation of arms. It is therefore our conclusion that the legitimacy of arms acquisition does not fall within the meaning of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
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Respect for and observance of human rights
The UN Charter establishes 'promotion and respect for human rights' as one of the primary purposes of the United Nations. Article 1, paragraph 3, refers as follows to:
[i]nternational co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Art. 1(3) UN Charter).
In analysing Article 1, commentaries on the UN Charter refer to elements of the provision containing human rights as constituting customary international law binding on all.
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This primary purpose is further buttressed by Article 55(c) of the UN Charter, which requires that the UN promote 'universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.' Moreover, UN Member States are bound under Article 56 of the Charter 'to take joint and separate action ... for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.' Article 55(c) has been interpreted in conjunction with Article 56 to impose legal obligations on member States to 'singly or jointly stand up for respecting human rights.' 62 The legitimate prerogative of a State to acquire arms in exercise of its sovereignty may therefore be conditional upon the obligation to respect and observe human rights both within a State's territory and externally.
Self-determination
Principles of self-determination and the equal rights of peoples in the UN Charter 63 can be said to represent two constituent elements of the same concept. Also embedded in international human rights law 64 self-determination is considered a fundamental human 60 If justification for the acquisition of arms is sought, the relevant provisions can be found in the principles of sovereignty and/or sovereign equality according to The issue at point is to determine what legal consequences of self-determination may be attributed to the question of arms transfers. In particular, whether an arms transfer to a non-state actor can be justified under the UN Charter principle on self-determination. However, generally as well as in the specific context of arms transfers, it is difficult to infer specific rights and obligations from the principle of self-determination by virtue of the concept's complexity and vagueness, owing partially to the lack of both definition of the 'peoples' and the content of the principle itself.
Determining 'who' constitutes a people is complicated by questions such as 'how' such a people is constituted (i.e. its membership), 'how' it exercises its rights (the act of selfdetermination), and how self-determination is implemented. Beyond the question of qualification of the holders of the right to self-determination, it is noteworthy that in the process of decolonisation, the armed support of colonial/liberation movements was not considered lawful by a number of States and in the absence of any consensus on the issue was not recognised in the Friendly Relations Declaration.
Thus, although this Declaration recognises the applicability of the principle of selfdetermination beyond the traditional context of decolonization it also states that it does not authorise 'any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples … and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people … without distinction as to race, creed or colour.'
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International Human Rights, Humanitarian, and Disarmament Law
Existing regulation of the arms trade by international humanitarian and disarmament law
Traditionally a distinction has been made between international humanitarian law (IHL) 67 -which focused on regulating the use of a weapon in armed conflict-and international disarmament law, which sought primarily to prohibit the production, stockpiling, and transfer of certain weapons, especially those termed 'of mass 65 The basic premise of the self-determination is the right of people of an existing State 'freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the destruction'. 68 This distinction has been significantly blurred in recent years, with certain States even referring to treaties prohibiting anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions as 'humanitarian disarmament'.
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'Respect and ensure respect'
Article 1 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions provides that:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances. 70 This provision potentially has significant relevance for the lawful transfer of weapons. This obligation 'to ensure respect' could already be understood as prohibiting the transfer of any weapon that would be likely to facilitate or be used to commit a violation of international humanitarian law in both international and non-international armed conflict. Thus, in July 2010, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stated to the first Preparatory Committee meeting for an ATT that: 68 Weapons transfers should be considered in light of States' existing obligation to 'ensure respect' for IHL. This is generally interpreted as conferring a responsibility on third-party States not involved in an armed conflict to refrain from encouraging a party to an armed conflict to violate IHL, avoid action that would assist in such violations, and take appropriate steps to put an end to such violations. States that export arms can be considered particularly influential in 'ensuring respect' for IHL owing to their ability to provide or withhold the means by which violations may be committed. ibid.
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Section on Criteria, §B2, available at: www.adh-geneve.ch/RULAC/pdf/Chairmans-draft-paper.pdf. The rule is set out in Article 35, paragraph 1 of 1977 Additional Protocol I. It is a general restatement of the international legal reality that certain weapons can never be lawfully used, while other weapons can be used subject to the restrictions imposed by applicable international law.
First and foremost, the use of weapons which are by their nature indiscriminate is prohibited. 80 This rule flows from the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, 81 which is underpinned by arguably the most fundamental rule of international humanitarian law, the principle of distinction, whereby military operations shall only be directed against military objectives, and never against civilians, the civilian population, or civilian objects.
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There is, though, no agreement on which weapons may be outlawed by this rule. One lawyer suggests that an example of such an inherently indiscriminate weapon would be 'a long-range missile with a guidance system so rudimentary or unreliable that its chances of striking a military objective are almost happenstance.' 83 Second, the use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited. 84 According to this rule, 'it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering.' 85 Unnecessary suffering has in turn been defined as 'harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives.' 86 The practical criteria to judge the application of this principle, however, remain controversial. 87 Examples of weapons whose use in armed conflict is widely believed to have been prohibited on the basis of this principle are: exploding bullets; expanding 'dum-dum' bullets; blinding laser weapons; and the use of poison. In addition, the use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may therefore not be used as a weapon. 89 No conventional weapons have, though, been prohibited on the basis of this principle.
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There are also conventional prohibitions on the use of specific weapons in armed conflict, notably blinding laser weapons, 91 as well as expanding bullets 92 and exploding bullets. 93 These prohibitions are believed to have attained the status of customary international law, applicable to all. There is no treaty-based prohibition of the transfer of such weapons.
Conventional weapons whose transfer is prohibited
The transfer of a limited number of weapons is, though, generally prohibited to each State Party to the relevant international treaty. Thus, under 1996 Amended Protocol II annexed to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the transfer of any landmines (anti-personnel or anti-vehicle) is generally prohibited to any non-State actor, while mines whose use is prohibited under the Protocol-basically only 'nondetectable' anti-personnel mines or remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines not equipped with an effective self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanism and a back-up self-deactivation feature-may not be transferred to anyone. 
Concluding remarks
IHL places relatively few restrictions on the transfer of conventional weapons. An obligation not to transfer weapons to anyone that will use them to violate IHL can be 89 See, e.g., Rule 45, in ibid. According to the ICRC, the rule is applicable in international armed conflicts and arguably also in armed conflicts of a non-international character. Existing regulation of the arms trade by international human rights law
International human rights law is the body of international law that seeks to protect the individual against, primarily, the power of the nation State. Especially since the end of the 1939-1945 War and the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, many human rights treaties have been adopted. Some offer generalised protection (e.g., the two 1966 International Covenants-on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), while others deal with protection against certain abuses (e.g., torture, forced disappearances), or address the rights of certain groups (e.g. women, children, migrants, persons with disabilities).
As noted in Section 2 above, under the Charter of the United Nations the UN 'shall promote … universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.' 99 Furthermore, all UN Members 'pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization' for the achievement of this purpose. 100 Yet, no human rights treaty specifically addresses the trade in weapons nor does international human rights law specifically prohibit the use per se of any weapon, whatever its categorisation. 101 Furthermore, even though weapons are used across many countries to commit the most serious human rights violations, 102 the transfer of weapons in and of itself does not typically fall within the ambit of a human rights treaty as far as the transferring State is concerned. This is because the obligations upon each State Party are to ensure the enjoyment of rights to all persons under its jurisdiction. This scope of application means the obligations laid down in human rights instruments offer protection primarily to persons present on a State's own territory as well as, in a widely held (though not consensus) view, where a State exercises effective control extraterritorially. 103 Indeed, certain weapons whose use as a method of warfare is prohibited in armed conflict by international humanitarian law, such as riot control agents or expanding 'dumdum' bullets, are not illegal under human rights law in certain other, albeit limited, situations. on the basis that foreign government supplied weapons to the State that committed the violations.
Nonetheless, the level of respect by the recipient State for human rights is potentially relevant to any determination of whether a proposed weapons transfer should proceedand may result in a determination that a State has committed an internationally wrongful act-on the basis either of national legislation 104 or of the concept of complicity under international law. 105 The argument has been made that States should be obliged to investigate the end-use of the weapons they authorise for international transfer analogous to their obligations to ensure that persons who are removed, expelled, or extradited from their jurisdiction will not face persecution or torture.
106 But, as has been noted, the challenge will be to prove causation.
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The Chair's Draft Paper of 3 March 2011, circulated during the Second Preparatory Committee meeting for an ATT, proposed that a weapons transfer shall not be authorised where there is a 'substantial risk' that the weapons 'would be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human rights law.'
108 Rights especially relevant to such a determination could include the following:
The right to life (covering, for example, assassinations or other forms of murder, • enforced disappearance, as well as genocide),
The right to freedom from torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or • degrading treatment, and
The rights to liberty and security of person and the right to freedom from • slavery,
The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, • The right to recognition as a person before the law, • as well as the right to protest (which brings together a number of different rights under a single 'umbrella' right such as the rights to freedom of assembly and of expression), and, potentially, rights to health, education, food, and housing. 109 There is no immediate relationship between the mere supply, even if not properly regulated, of weapons and the possible 'indiscriminate' use thereof in a third country, the latter's action constituting the direct and decisive cause of the accident which the applicant suffered.
Common position on arms trade, which restricts arms exports to countries which breach humanitarian law, seriously violate human rights, also considers the socio-economic situation of the recipient country. It states, in its criterion eight, that:
Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.
They will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.
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The Genocide Convention
Whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, genocide is a crime under international law 111 and States are obliged to prevent and punish it, and refrain from complicity in it. It is generally agreed that the provisions of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter, the 1948 Genocide Convention) has become part of customary international law binding on all States and has also been recognised as a peremptory norm of international law. 112 In the context of the arms trade, there may be significant legal implications for a State or private individuals that deliver arms to a State or for private individuals involved in the commission of genocide. Two situations relevant to the arms trade may be distinguished: complicity in genocide, 113 and the obligation to prevent genocide.
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Complicity in genocide
The duty to refrain from complicity in genocide is not limited to acts of genocide committed by another State but also to international organisations 115 and other non-In 2006, the District Court of The Hague had also convicted Guus Van Kouwenhoven for complicity in war crime for providing the then-Liberian President, Charles Taylor, with weapons which were used to fight a civil war characterised by massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 148 Guus Van Kouwenhoven was subsequently acquitted on appeal for lack of evidence in 2008, 149 but this does not change the fact that individuals can potentially be held criminally responsible for complicity in the commission of an international crime through the selling of arms.
Although this jurisprudence comes from national legal systems, it exemplifies a practice of States that can be of relevance not only for the formation of a customary rule of international law, but which could also be used by an international Court, such as the ICC, for the interpretation of its own provision on complicity.
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The ICC is seen by some as a promising way to establish the criminal responsibility of arms dealers who are complicit in international crimes, in particular because of the lack of national legislation on the matter, which allows the broker to operate in a grey zone.
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In addition, most existing domestic regulation on the arms trade limits the jurisdiction of the courts to the persons and property present within the territorial boundaries of the state. Since many brokers are involved in third-country arms deals, wherein the weapons never actually pass though the country in which the broker operates, national law is ineffective.
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In conclusion, international criminal law is certainly a relevant body of law with regard to the arms trade. The ICC could become a powerful tool to combat illicit arms deals that contribute to the commission of international crimes. In particular, it could target the illegal activities of arms brokers and members of non-State armed groups who operate today mostly with impunity. However, the ICC can only serve as a complement to a more effective legal system at national level. In view of the elaboration of a future ATT, due consideration should be given to an international criminal law clause which would ensure that States Parties adopt meaningful domestic criminal legislation governing the illicit arms trade and which would ensure the establishment of criminal responsibility for those complicit in the commission of international crimes, irrespective of where their activities take place. As mentioned by Claudette Torbey: 'Illicit brokering occurs when arms are transferred without government authorization, but since few countries have a system of authorization for brokering activities, brokers normally operate in a grey zone'. She adds in a footnote that: 'Grey market transfers occur when government agencies or government-backed private entities covertly sell or deliver arms to illicit recipients in another country. ' 
UNIDIR W W W. U N I D I R . O R G
About UNIDIR
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)-an autonomous institute within the United Nations-conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR's activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations.
